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Abstract 
As awareness of the role governance in the performance of health systems has 
increased, so has the need to come up with systematic means to evaluate 
governance shortcomings to develop adequate interventions. This working paper 
describes a framework to assess governance in the health systems of low-income 
countries that is intended to have empirical applicability with a problem-driven 
approach. The analysis is grounded on a re-categorization of governance 
dimensions for greater heuristic power, with an emphasis made on the importance 
of strategic systems design and accountability. The proposed methodology 
includes mapping of both formal and informal institutions, actors and networks. 
This underscores the idea that in order to properly address governance weaknesses 
it is of utmost importance to have an insight into whether the interplay of formal 
and informal norms facilitates or undermines system performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Responding adequately to the health needs of a population requires not 
only medical breakthroughs but also timely and efficient delivery of 
preventive and curative services. This is all the more meaningful as it is 
often found that in those settings where health needs are the greatest, 
the administrative capacity of the state to implement policy is limited. 
The acknowledgement that successful healthcare delivery requires 
effective institutions and management has led government officials, 
academics and international donors alike to emphasize governance as a 
key element in the quest for practical solutions for strengthening health 
systems.     
Governance as it applies specifically to health systems’ performance 
has however remained a complicated topic to conceptualize and 
operationalize, especially in terms of producing practical advice and 
solutions.1 In recent years several health sector frameworks assessing 
governance have been proposed (Siddiqi et al. 2009, Lewis and 
Pettersson 2009, Brinkerhoff and Bossert 2008, Vian, Savedoff, and 
Mathisien 2010), which offer insights into how governance may impact 
health outcomes and suggest which elements associated with 
governance are important to consider.  
Nevertheless, a need remains for an approach that goes beyond 
accurately depicting the state of formal governance in a given place and 
time. What most of the governance frameworks and assessments of 
health systems lack is an explicit acknowledgement of the important 
role played by the political context in which health systems are 
embedded.2 In this article we propose a framework to assess health 
systems’ governance that incorporates political power and influence 
analysis to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the 
motivations and incentives underpinning the actions of major 
stakeholders in the health sector. The ultimate goal is to generate rich 
contextual information based upon which adequate and effective health 
systems’ strengthening interventions can be developed. 
We do not intend to present a one size fits all model to evaluate 
governance. We recognize that health systems are complex and can 
vary significantly from case to case, so that the specific arrays of 
institutions and actors impinging on any given governance related 
outcome are impossible to determine beforehand. For this reason, more 
than a universalistic recipe to carry out governance assessments, we 
present a methodological approach that is based on theory and clear 
analytical definitions, which can be applied and modified by the 
researcher depending on the particular circumstances in each case. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1  One of the major challenges to assess governance in the health systems of low 
income countries is that empirically it is almost impossible to distinguish the 
degree to which observed poor performance may be attributable to weak 
governance, technical inefficiencies or simply to lack of sufficient financial 
resources.  
2 	   Most of these frameworks are designed to provide a general overview of the 
state of key governance indicators across entire health systems. This type of 
approach is useful for comparative analysis, to rank or categorize countries, or 
to track changes in governance performance through time.	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The development of this framework begins with the acknowledgement 
that substantially different definitions and approaches to governance 
exist across disciplines. In the international development community the 
emphasis tends to remain centred on the concept of good governance, 
which is usually preoccupied with adequate formal and technical 
prescriptions to improve the performance of the public sector (UNDP 
2011, World Health Organization 2011, World Bank 2007, Ruger 
2007). In academia, however, governance is increasingly 
conceptualised in terms of the informal but structured and systematic 
interactions of actors (often non-state actors), which yield collective 
solutions to specific needs (Booth 2011, Benz et al. 2007, Draude 2007, 
Foerster and Koechlin 2011). In our work, we believe strongly that both 
perspectives shed light into important dimensions that affect the 
performance of health systems. Therefore, it is important to work 
towards implementable research tools that bring together the strengths 
of both disciplines as a necessary first step to begin conceptualising 
more effective avenues for health systems strengthening.  
This article is organized as follows. Section II describes the proposed 
analytical framework for governance of health systems. Section III 
describes how the framework can be applied to assess the formal and 
informal institutions of the health system from a structured governance 
perspective across different levels of analysis. Section IV reflects on 
remaining methodological challenges and on future directions to 
continue the development of theory and tools for advancing the 
understanding of the governance of health systems. 
2. An analytical framework for assessing 
governance in the health sector 
The analytical approach presented here is based on the conviction that 
to correctly assess the performance of the formal institutions of the 
health system in low income countries it is necessary to address both 
the formal and the informal dimensions underpinning the actions of key 
stakeholders. In other words, because it is quite evident that sometimes 
even well designed formal systems fail to work as expected in practice, 
a comprehensive research agenda should strive to provide insights into 
where substantial gaps between formal and informal practices may 
exist. We believe both aspects should be evaluated in unison because 
formal and informal norms, rules and beliefs are often deeply 
intertwined in reality. For this reason, we have developed a framework 
that includes analytical tools to trace the formal and informal elements 
impacting the governance of health systems.  
Because both health systems and governance are broad concepts, we 
begin by clarifying what is meant by each of these terms and how they 
are brought together in this framework. The World Health Organization 
(WHO) has broadly defined health systems as “all organizations, 
institutions and resources that are devoted to producing health actions” 
(World Health Organization 2000, Murray and Frenk 2000). In a step to 
increase analytical clarity, WHO has further advanced the notion that 
health systems can be disaggregated into six major sub-systems or 
building blocks: 1. Governance; 2. Financing; 3. Human Resources; 4. 
Information; 5. Medicines and Technologies; and 6. Service Delivery 
(WHO, 2007). These categories, while helpful in identifying and tracing 
key functions that any health system should be able to perform, 
A framework to assess governance of health systems in low income countries  
 
 
	  
7 
 
nevertheless do not represent mutually exclusive boundaries. Rather, as 
De Savigny and Adam (De Savigny and Adam 2009) have pointed out, 
special attention needs be given to the interactions and relationships 
among those building blocks. Ultimately, it is those dynamic linkages 
that make up the system because in practice all building blocks affect 
each other and need each other to produce the desired outputs. Because 
of the interconnectedness of the building blocks, rather than advocating 
the analysis of the different functions of health systems, we find it more 
useful and empirically relevant that the point of departure for the 
analysis be one previously identified governance related shortcoming of 
the health system and to then trace its causes across the different 
building blocks. As our framework explicitly concerns governance of 
health systems we view governance as a cross cutting dimension across 
all other building blocks, with service delivery providing the central 
outputs of the system and the other building blocks providing the 
required inputs. 
With regards to the field of governance studies, there is a very diverse 
understanding of the concept depending on which discipline one looks 
at (Chhotray and Stoker 2009). For this framework we adopt an 
approach to governance that draws from both political economy and 
sociology research as well as from the more pragmatically oriented 
international development organizations.  
From political economy and sociology we derive our interest in the 
rules through which different societies arrive at collective decision 
making and therefore we adopt a non-normative definition of 
governance such as that by Brinkerhoff and Bossert (2008, 3): 
“Governance is about the rules that distribute roles and responsibilities 
among societal actors and that shape the interactions among them.” The 
rules may be formal or informal, written or unwritten, but their 
centrality lies in that they provide incentives and constraints to certain 
types of behaviour to the relevant actors and stakeholders. As applied to 
health systems this understanding of governance refers to the 
institutions that define and regulate the processes through which health 
systems manage human resources, acquire and distribute medicines and 
technologies, generate and disseminate information, and provide means 
to finance the provision of health services to the population. 
From the leading organizations in international development and health 
we share the interest not just in the rules formally governing health 
systems, but also in how those rules are actually implemented. The 
assumption is that when formal rules and processes are defined and 
implemented correctly social outcomes should be improved.  
One of the first challenges to empirical governance research arises 
while seeking to operationalize the term governance into dimensions 
and indicators that are measureable (Grindle 2007).3 A review of the 
literature makes it clear that different organisations give emphasis to 
different governance dimensions. Table 1 provides an overview of 
several of the many elements that have been associated with public 
governance according to different institutions.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
3  For example, some authors addressed this problem by using one single 
dimension, such as corruption, as a proxy for overall governance (Lewis 2006). 
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Table 1 Relevant governance dimensions according to different institutions4 
Institution	   Dimensions	  of	  Governance	  
World	  Bank	  Institute	  
(Worldwide	  Governance	  
Indicators,	  WGIs)	  
• Voice	  and	  Accountability	  
• Political	  Stability	  and	  	  Absence	  
of	  Violence	  
• Government	  Effectiveness	  
• Regulatory	  Quality	  
• Rule	  of	  Law	  
• Control	  of	  
Corruption	  
United	  Nations	   • Participation	  
• Rule	  of	  Law	  
• Transparency	  
• Responsiveness	  
• Consensus	  Orientation	  
• Equity	  
• Effectiveness	  and	  
Efficiency	  
• Accountability	  
• Strategic	  Vision	  
Overseas	  Development	  
Institute/	  World	  
Governance	  Assessment	  	  
• Participation	  
• Fairness	  
• Decency	  
• Accountability	  
• Transparency	  
• Efficiency	  
Mo	  Ibrahim	  Foundation/	  
Ibrahim	  Index	  of	  African	  
Governance	  
• Safety	  and	  Rule	  of	  Law	  
• Participation	  and	  Human	  
Rights	  
• Sustainable	  
Economic	  
Opportunity	  
• Human	  
Development	  
 
We nevertheless find this approach unsatisfactory because, however 
important each of these principles may be, at closer examination it 
seems quite unlikely that any could be plausibly considered as a stand 
alone category. Rather, we make two assumptions with regards to these 
governance dimensions: first, that not all of them share the same 
qualitative nature, so it is not possible to establish comparability among 
them on a basis of equal assumptions and, second, that many of these 
frequently cited dimensions of governance are in fact closely 
interrelated. We believe that categorizing these dimensions and 
providing theoretically informed presumptions about causality links 
among them is a first step to give governance analysis greater 
explanatory power and to therefore increase its potential for having 
empirical applicability. 
Thus, for analytical purposes we have divided the components of good 
governance into three groups: 5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4	  	   Sources: World Bank at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp,  
United Nations at www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/ 
governance.asp, ODI at www.odi.org.uk/work/projects/00-07-world-governance 
-assessment/Framework.html, Mo Ibrahim Foundation at www.moibrahim-
foundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index. 
5 	   We make a conscious decision to not include as desirable features of 
governance overtly political considerations (such as political stability and 
violence) for several reasons. First, because they are qualitatively different to 
our understanding of what dimensions of governance are since they are not 
attributes of governance but rather background conditions that predispose, or 
explain governance performance (they are explanatory rather than dependent 
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1. Governance inputs: these refer to how and by whom are the 
institutions and rules governing the health system constructed. 
Analysing governance inputs entails answering the following 
questions: Who are the stakeholders involved in defining and 
designing health policy? (participation) To what extent do 
government and state officials cooperate with or involve other 
stakeholders in terms of goal setting and policy design for public 
health decisions? (consensus orientation). Are the institutions of 
the health system set up in a manner conducive to the attainment 
of the health policy goals? (strategic vision and systems design). 
The importance of governance inputs cannot be underestimated 
because even impeccable execution of faulty policies will fail to 
bring adequate benefits to the population. Properly addressing the 
health needs of a population requires a complex mix of medical, 
scientific, technical, political and organizational requirements and 
skills to come together. Therefore, coherent policy design backed 
by sound evidence, technical expertise and cooperation or 
consultation with relevant stakeholders is an essential prerequisite 
for successful public sector performance. 
2. Governance processes: these are basic attributes characterizing 
the implementation of the rules and administrative procedures 
governing the health sector. They refer to the manner in which 
operations and regulations are executed and can be assumed to 
have important implications for the quality of the outcomes 
produced. The governance processes emphasized in this 
framework are accountability, transparency and control of 
corruption, all three of which are closely interrelated. The 
presumption being that, if accountability is improved, then 
corruption is diminished and agents are induced to be transparent 
in their actions. 6 
3. Governance outcomes: these refer to positive qualities that 
health system outputs should generate once rules and processes 
have been designed and implemented. They are criteria that can 
be used to assess the social desirability of health services because 
the ultimate goal of health systems is to have a significant positive 
impact on the well being of the population based on their health 
needs. The governance associated health system outcomes that are 
emphasized in this framework are: responsiveness of the health 
system to the needs of the population, equitable access of all 
groups to health services, and efficiency in the use of resources. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the categorization of governance dimensions 
discussed above, shown against the backdrop of the interlocking 
building blocks of health systems. The illustration suggests some of the 
key relationships and interactions involved in the governance of public 
health service delivery.7  
	  
	  
variables). Second, their inclusion contributes to a perpetuation of the view of 
governance assessments as normative impositions. 
6  The centrality of accountability in determining governance outcomes has 
extensively been acknowledged in the literature. See for example, (Paul 1992), 
(Brinkerhoff and Bossert 2008), (Lewis and Pettersson 2009),(Hammer, Aiyar, 
and Samji 2007);(George 2003).  
7  It should be noted that this model is not intended to illustrate governance as a 
purely linear process. Like any system, its different components act, react and 
interact with and to each other (De Savigny and Adam, 2009). Governance 
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Figure 1 Key governance dimensions and interactions across health systems 
In this framework we want to underscore the idea that to adequately 
assess governance inputs and processes it is crucial to take into account 
both formal and informal elements that affect health systems 
performance. Because formal rules governing the health system are in 
many cases not effectively applied in spite of adequate formal 
regulations, it is critical that a methodology to assess health system 
performance should include an understanding of informal institutions 
and actors (Jacobs 2011). 
The importance of informal institutions in relation to the state in 
developing countries has been extensively researched and described 
from a variety of approaches (Jacobs, 2011).8 Here we advocate an 
approach that is based on a power and influence analysis that helps to 
reveal discrepancies between formal and informal decision making 
power and accounts for how different forms of political regimes and 
legitimation modes can have an impact on observed governance 
performance of health systems. 
3. Application of the governance of health systems 
framework 
The framework involves assessing health policies and strategic 
institutional design (governance inputs), and performing an 
accountability evaluation (governance processes) at critical institutional 
	  
	  
structures affect behaviour, which in turn affects the structures and system 
outcomes affect successive inputs. With a recognition that these complexities and the 
limitations that any two-dimensional model poses to conveying a real life 
situation or process this figure merely illustrates the variety in governance 
dimensions and their qualitative differences. 
8	  	   This has given light to notions such as ‘economy of affection’(Hyden 2006), 
‘strong societies and weak states’(Migdal 1988), ‘politics of the belly’(Bayart, 
Ellis, and Hibou 1999) (Bayart 1993). 
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junctions with an emphasis in understanding both the formal and 
informal determinants underpinning the quality of governance. The 
ultimate goal is to generate insights into possible routes to improve 
health systems outcomes such as responsiveness, equity and efficiency. 
The analytical tools to implement this approach involve combining 
institutional and stakeholder mapping with rational choice 
assumptions.9 The data collection methods include a desk review phase, 
and two rounds of interviews with relevant stakeholders. This section 
begins with two clarifications on theory and methods and then presents 
detailed steps to implement our proposed governance of health systems 
assessment. 
Firstly, to make best use of the framework we suggest a problem-driven 
approach; with the starting point for the analysis being a particular issue 
of concern (or tracer) related to health system performance. Therefore, 
our approach does not involve mapping the entire array of institutions 
and stakeholders in the health system but only those that have a direct 
link with the outcome of interest, allowing for a more detailed 
understanding of the main problems at stake. 10  
Secondly, as is widely acknowledged, stakeholder maps are not neutral 
tools (Aligica 2006). Rather, very different stakeholder maps can be 
constructed depending on which dimensions and characteristics of the 
stakeholders are highlighted, the choice of which should be driven by 
clear and sound theoretical considerations. In this case, rational choice 
assumptions have been chosen because they are useful to reveal 
informal linkages, for example by prompting the researcher to inquire 
about sources of power, sources of support as well as sources of 
revenue and benefits for different stakeholders. The rational choice 
approach helps to analyse incentives for different stakeholders in a way 
that reveals how implementation of rules and regulations as well as 
enforcement of formal accountability lines may be distorted by 
incentives to serve the interests of those agents that have decision 
making power affecting the stakeholders’ career path and material 
benefits.11  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
9  The underlying notion is that institutions (formal and informal) play a 
substantial role in shaping behaviours (North 1990) and that institutionalism can 
fruitfully be complemented with assumptions about individual service providers 
and public sector employees who, as rational actors, will seek to pursue the 
course of action that better promotes their personal interests. More concretely, 
politicians can be expected to prefer strategies that either perpetuate or 
strengthen their political power (including the institutional clout of their 
organization within the structures of the state and government), while 
bureaucrats and health sector workers can be expected to follow strategies that 
maximise their expected income and career advancement prospects. See 
(Scharpf 1997)for an extensive description of how this combination can be 
implemented. 
10  For example, assuming the tracer issue is continued stock out rates of essential 
medicines in public health facilities, the pertinent institutional/stakeholder 
mapping would be of the public sector medicine supply chain.  
11  Rational choice assumptions also help to underscore that successful intervention 
design should be underpinned by an understanding of the motivations and 
interests of major stakeholders involved to improve success and sustainability. 
Furthermore, stakeholder analysis that acknowledges context-specific realities 
permeated by different interests, values and traditions may unveil informal 
power structures when real decision-making power is actually exercised outside 
or instead of the formal legal-regulatory framework (Nash, Hudson, and Lutrell 
2006, Boesen 2008, Olivier de Sardan 2009, Kelsall 2008, 2009). 
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The application of our framework to assess governance in health 
systems involves three steps to compile and analyse information to 
evaluate governance inputs and processes as discussed above.  
1. Desk review covering the literature on the case with the 
following three aims: 
a. Gaining an understanding of the basic features of the political 
context.  
To adequately frame the rational choice elements of the analysis into a 
correct interpretation of the incentives and constraints to action faced by 
major actors in a health system it is necessary to take into consideration 
the contextual peculiarities of the political environment, including type 
of political regime and modes of political legitimation. Clearly, 
stakeholders’ power and influence will be expressed differently in a 
context characterized by democratic elections, political freedoms and 
effective law enforcement than in a context characterized by 
authoritarian, patrimonial traits, where popular mobilization tends to be 
discouraged and enforcement of the law is weak or merely a tool for 
particularistic power-building. Keeping in mind concepts such as neo-
patrimonialism and clientelism can help to better understand informal 
power linkages. Clientelist and patronage networks are common 
mechanisms through which neo-patrimonial regimes often legitimise 
themselves in power and distribute tangible benefits to their 
constituencies. Often, they pervade, partly replace, or distort formal but 
ill-functioning institutions of democratic representation.12 Clientelist 
networks can pervade politics and society to the extent that they often 
come to be regarded as the only means to access supposedly public 
services (see for example Auyero 2001). 
Specific questions on political context to be researched include: 
− How can the political regime be characterized?  
− What mechanisms of political legitimation are prevalent?  
− How is civil society organized and incorporated into the 
system? 
− What is the distribution of effective political power? 
b. Drafting a first version of an institutional/stakeholder map based on 
the formal institutional organization as well as main rules and 
regulations governing the system in the issue area of interest.  
The fact that health systems in developing countries frequently have 
close ties to international funding and development agencies means that 
the institutional mapping will involve agencies and actors (state and 
non-state) at the international, national as well as local level. Appendix 
1 provides a stakeholder identification and characterisation tool that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
12  The concept of neo-patrimonialism is inspired by Max Weber’s ideal type 
tripartite classification of authority, referring to the coexistence of patrimonial 
and legal-bureaucratic elements constituting the state (Bratton and van de Walle 
1997, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002, Eisenstadt 1972, Clapham 1985, 
Medard 1982, Jacobs 2011). In this framework it serves to describe a general 
state of politics in which informal power networks, including but not limited to 
clientelist relations, thrive within the formal institutions of the state (Siddiqi et 
al. 2009, 6).  
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outlines the parameters to what information is to be collected on each 
stakeholder. 
The mapping exercise should be a starting point to investigate the 
following issues: 
− Where are the critical institutional junctions in the system where 
governance concerns pose the greatest systemic risks? These refer 
to particular positions within an institutional arrangement where 
governance weaknesses have the greatest impact on systemic 
performance. Or in other words, areas in which governance 
weaknesses have an essential impact on the entire process. 
− Who are the most powerful and influential stakeholders whose 
actions have a decisive effect on performance? The power and 
influence can be expressed as the ability to change the system, to 
delay changes to the system, or to disrupt system performance.  
c. Compiling a preliminary list of relevant stakeholders who should 
be interviewed.  
2. First round of interviews 
The first round of interviews with the identified stakeholders has two 
distinct goals: 
a. Validation of the institutional and stakeholder map 
b. Compilation of the perceptions of different stakeholders on the 
distribution of effective power and influence across the influence 
area. 
An example of an interview questionnaire that would be relevant to 
obtain the information described above for an assessment of a medicine 
supply chain is presented in Appendix 2.  
Together, steps 1 and 2 provide information to assess governance inputs 
(who and how participates in the system, strategic vision, systems and 
policy design). After the first round of interviews the researcher should 
be able to do the following: 
− Fill out the stakeholder identification and characterization tool. 
− Identify the critical institutional junctions for governance risks.  
− Identify systemic flaws. Health systems are complex and may 
evolve out of piecemeal reforms through time, sometimes leading to 
systemic design problems such as duplication of functions or 
conflicting mandates across state agencies.13  
− Identify inconsistencies between formal and informal division of 
roles, decision making power and accountability lines. 
− Identify stakeholders at the critical institutional junctions that 
should be interviewed (or re-interviewed) for the accountability 
analysis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
13 	   See (Booth 2010) for a discussion of institutional design flaws in Sub Saharan 
African cases. 
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3. Second round of interviews 
The second round of interviews is intended to focus on the actors 
situated in critical institutional junctions. The primary aim of these 
interviews is to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the conditions 
necessary to hold key stakeholders accountable for their performance. 
This assessment entails researching two different aspects shaping the 
incentives and constraints facing key stakeholders.  
− First, the formal components that are necessary for effective 
accountability to be enforced: clarity of mandate, availability of 
adequate resources to carry out the mandate, monitoring, and 
enforcement of sanctions for non-compliance.14 The goal is to 
determine relative strengths and weaknesses in the institutional and 
regulatory framework that have a potentially adverse impact on the 
incentives of sector officials and health care providers. 
− Informal incentives to serve the interest of agents or constituencies 
other than the ones to which the agent should be formally 
accountable to. This analysis is an extension of the previous one 
described in step 2 and has the intent to further assess whether 
formal accountability lines reinforce or rather conflict with informal 
power structures. 
 
An example of an interview questionnaire designed to shed light into 
these issues can be found in Appendix 3. 
Insights from the accountability assessment may suggest different 
interventions depending on the sources of major weaknesses identified. 
For instance, the policy implications will be quite different if the system 
experiences problems due to: a) staff lacking information on duties and 
responsibilities; or b) staff lacking the necessary resources to carry out 
the mandate properly; or c) low incentives of staff to perform due to 
lack of monitoring; or d) there is information about deviations from 
performance targets but these go unsanctioned. Alternatively, at the 
informal level it is important to be aware of whether observable 
governance weaknesses are in fact an expression of power relations that 
distort the incentives of agents to pursue the formal goals required of 
them by the rules and regulations governing their positions. 
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper contributes to the understanding of governance in the health 
systems of low-income countries by providing a practical conceptual 
framework to carry out assessments that may aid in developing better-
informed reforms and interventions. In bringing forward this approach, 
we want to convey the strong belief that to improve performance in 
systems as complex as those governing the health sector, it is necessary 
to understand governance as a multidimensional concept and that 
among its different dimensions there are linkages and trade-offs to be 
considered.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
14  (Baez-Camargo 2011) provides a detailed discussion of the elements needed for 
effective accountability to be implemented, as well as of the challenges involved in 
enforcing accountability in the specific case of public health services. 
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Thus, we argue for a problem-driven approach that, while ultimately 
searching for practical answers, also acknowledges the 
interconnectedness of actors and functions in health systems across 
different levels of analysis. While recognizing the importance of 
addressing formal governance, the approach also underscores the 
relevance of informal institutions and stakeholder networks as 
significant phenomena affecting public governance processes, 
especially in many low-income countries.  
The implementation of the framework is based on an evaluation of 
governance inputs and processes with due attention to the influence of 
informal institutions and networks on performance. 
In developing this framework, we have made a conscious effort to 
develop an approach that incorporates some of the most meaningful 
lessons stemming from academic research while at the same time 
striving to retain the pragmatic quest for applicability that characterizes 
the work of the development community. The mechanism connecting 
both approaches has been to give emphasis to how institutions and 
norms (formal and informal) influence the choices available, and 
therefore the behaviours, of key actors in health systems.  
In any context a mix of formal and informal incentives pervade the 
every life choices of people. But, especially where multiple sets of 
norms and rules coexist in strong competition for shaping the incentives 
of public officials, the methodological challenge becomes greatest. For 
the researcher, the task is to firstly, correctly identify the set(s) of norms 
defining the alternative routes of actions open to the decision maker 
and, secondly, develop criteria to understand under which 
circumstances one or the other set of rules prevails in determining 
observed outcomes. This should be seen as an important aspect of 
theory development to be addressed in future work but it is also clear 
that the relative merit of any methodological approach will only become 
evident once it has been validated by its empirical usefulness after being 
tested in field research. This working paper is therefore first of all a 
contribution on the conceptual side of the dialectic process of dialogue 
between theory and practice.  
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Stakeholder identification and characterization tool 
Organization Name:  
Relevant individual name and position (if applicable) 
• Position in institutional Map: 
 
o Mandate:  
 
o Main Responsibility in the medicine supply chain  
 
o To whom is this actor/ organization formally accountable? 
 
o How does the stakeholder influence the public sector medicine supply system?: 
 
• Resources/power:  
o Access to or control over support mechanisms: 
§ Control over budget 
§ Ability to mobilize political constituencies  
§ Access to/ support from high level political decision makers 
§ Visibility/Voice 
§ Legitimacy (elected office, standing in community) 
o Access or control over sanctions 
§ Law enforcement capabilities 
§ Ability to withdraw political support 
§ Decision making power over human resources (hiring, firing, career promotions) 
§ Decision making power over salaries and financial incentives 
§ Veto power 
 
Incentives  
§ Who decides over remuneration and material rewards for this actor? 
§ Are these decisions made using clear criteria? 
§ Who decides over career prospects for this actor? 
§ Are these decisions made using clear criteria? 
§ Are formal accountability provisions in place? 
 
Summary: 
 
Critical decision node in system?   Interest in issue area:  Power: 
Yes/No     High/Low   High/Low
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Sample semi-structured interview questionnaire for stakeholders in a public sector 
medicine supply chain assessment 
	  
Show institutional map. Ask for comments and validation.  
Based on that ask following questions: 
-  How would you characterise the performance of the public sector medicine supply chain? -­‐ Which actors or organization(s) have greatest influence on the overall performance of the public sector 
medicine supply system in its current state? 
o Describe the nature of that influence, for example:  
§ Control over financial resources  
§ Control over procurement processes 
§ Control over medicine flows 
§ Decision making powers over high level appointments  
§ Oversight capabilities 
§ Enforcement capabilities 
 -­‐ To whom or to which constituency are those influential actors or organizations most responsive? 
 -­‐ Who or what organization has greater ability to disrupt the medicine supply chain? 
o Describe how that disruptive potential can be characterised, for example:  
§ Sidestepping rules and regulations  
§ Delaying administrative processes 
  -­‐ Who would be in your view the most powerful players (with greatest decision making power) capable of 
inducing meaningful change in the medicine supply chain?  
o Describe how is the power of those players expressed: 
§ Electoral power, power over sanctions, legislative power, popular support/legitimacy, 
access to media/voice. 
 -­‐ Who would be in your view the most powerful players (with greatest decision making power) capable of 
preventing or delaying meaningful change in the medicine supply chain?  
o Describe how is the power of those players expressed, for example: 
§ Mobilization of opposition  
§ Ability to delay administrative or legislative processes  
§ Formal veto power 
§ Ability to withdraw political support for reform 
 -­‐ From your perspective, which are the major governance challenges affecting the drug supply chain? 
 -­‐ From your perspective, what would be the most meaningful/ high-impact changes to significantly 
improve the performance of the drug supply chain? 
 
 -­‐ What would be in your view attainable medium term targets for improvement in performance of the 
medicine supply chain? 
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-­‐ What would you envision as feasible interventions to tackle those problems? 
 -­‐ How does your organization influence performance/outcomes of the public sector medicine supply chain? 
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Sample semi-structured interview questionnaire for accountability assessment 
 
- What are the responsibilities associated with your position? 
 
- What resources do you receive to carry out the tasks you are required to perform in your position? 
 
- Are those resources in your view commensurate to the mandate? 
o If not, elaborate 
 
- Is your performance at work monitored?  
- If so, by whom? 
 
- Is there a mechanism through which you or your organization can justify decisions, actions and 
performance? 
 
- Can you explain what sanctions for non-compliance apply to your office/ duties? 
 
- Are sanctions enforced? 
 
- Are incentives to good performance present in any form? 
 
- To whom are you/your area/organization accountable? 
 
- How are remuneration levels determined? 
 
- Who controls salary decisions? 
 
- How are human resources decisions made? Is there a clear career development path with articulated 
milestones and/or performance targets? 
 
 
